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Abstract
Supply shocks in the market for apprenticeship training *
We present a model with heterogeneous inputs and constant elasticity of substitution 
to examine the possible effects of a supply shock in the market for apprenticeship 
training. The model’s predictions are tested using data from a German high school 
reform that led to a one-time increase in the supply of highly educated apprentices. A 
difference-in-differences estimation strategy exploits regional variation in the timing 
of implementation, and an instrumental variable approach identifies the supply shock 
effects. We find that apprenticeship contracts among individuals with a high school 
degree increased by 7.8%, while apprentice wages were unaffected by the supply 
shock. Moreover, we find no evidence of substitution effects, as the number of training 
contracts among individuals with a lower-level school degree remained unchanged. Our 
model predicts that such effects may occur when wages are sticky for apprentices with 
a high level of education relative to their productivity, which signals inefficiencies in the 
market for apprenticeship training.
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1. Introduction 
In times of economic crisis and increasing costs of obtaining academic qualifications, a dual 
vocational system that combines firm-level training with vocational schooling is gaining 
popularity in many countries. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States recently 
launched programs to foster dual apprenticeship training tracks for young school leavers.1 In 
addition, owing to the economic downturn following the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing 
youth unemployment rates are likely to raise policymaker interest in apprenticeship programs 
that smooth the transition from education to the labor market. Governments expect substantial 
returns to such investments, most importantly through improving young job seekers’ 
employability, skills, and future careers.2 
Along with the increasing policy interest in training young people, labor economists are paying 
more attention to the functioning of the market for apprenticeship training (e.g., Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1999; Stevens 1999; Blatter et al. 2016; Dustmann and Schönberg 2009; Cavaglia et 
al. 2020). Despite widespread research on apprenticeship markets, little is known about the 
effects of supply shocks. However, the supply of apprentices fluctuates frequently because of 
demographic changes and increasing academization, or in relation to migration flows. 
The aim of our study is to shed light on the effect of a positive supply shock on the equilibrium 
price and quantity in the market for apprenticeship training. To predict the possible outcomes, 
we first present a simple theoretical model of the market for two types of school graduates 
(lower secondary school and high school graduates). In competitive training markets and under 
the assumption that apprentices with different levels of education are substitutes, we expect that 
a one-time supply shock of high school graduates leads to an increase (decrease) in the number 
of apprenticeship contracts among apprentices with a high school (lower secondary school) 
 
1 See https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20200218 and 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03052/SN03052.pdf. 
2 See Ryan (2001), and Wolter and Ryan (2011). 
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degree and a decrease (increase) in the wage for high school (lower secondary school) 
graduates. However, the assumption of competitive markets may be particularly strong in the 
context of the German apprenticeship market, as apprentice wages are subject to collective 
bargaining agreements across a wide range of training occupations, and employer associations 
and unions are involved in many aspects of apprenticeship training (Dustmann & Schönberg 
2009). To the extent that institutions in Germany have led to sticky wages, theory predicts that 
a supply shock of highly educated apprentices would be absorbed by training firms if there was 
excess demand prior to the supply shock. As a result, a positive supply shock would lead to 
more apprenticeship contracts without negatively affecting wages. 
Our empirical identification strategy exploits the effects of a high school reform in Germany 
that decreased the duration of high school by one year, which resulted in two cohorts graduating 
in the same year in a particular state. We exploit regional variation regarding the timing of 
implementation (see Figure A1) to identify supply shock effects on the apprenticeship market. 
In Germany, the supply of apprentices with a high school degree is quantitatively important, as 
such applicants constitute a large and increasing minority of all apprentices. We apply 
difference-in-differences estimation techniques to empirically identify the effects of the school 
reform on the number of apprenticeship contracts and apprentice wages, and we also employ 
fixed-effects and an instrumental variables panel regression to identify the association between 
supply and apprenticeship contracts and wages.3 
Our results suggest that the one-time supply shock due to the school reform led to a 7.8% 
increase in apprenticeship contracts, but we find no significant effects on wages. The effects 
are robust across different subsamples and identification strategies. Thus, our results are in line 
 
3 Previous studies have analyzed the relationship between school graduates and apprenticeship contracts (e.g., 
Baldi et al. 2014; Maier and Walden 2014 for Germany; Muehlemann et al. 2009 for Switzerland). However, 
demographic changes in the number of school graduates are typically small and the number of training contracts 
adjusts smoothly over time. 
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with a market that can be characterized by excess demand for highly educated apprentices, a 
finding that can be explained by sticky wages in the market for apprentices. 
Our results have important implications. As firms are unable to adjust wages downwards in the 
short run, supply shocks will only be absorbed by training firms in the case of excess demand 
for apprentices with a particular education level. While the high school reform led to an increase 
in the supply of highly educated apprentices, other types of supply shocks (e.g., due to 
migration) may lead to an increase in the supply of apprentices with a lower education level. In 
such a case, the inability of firms to adjust wages would lead to a scenario of excess supply in 
the apprenticeship market, at least to the extent that firms expect a positive association between 
productivity and an apprentice’s education level. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the German school and 
apprenticeship training system and the implementation of the high school reform. Section 3 
presents the theoretical model of the market for apprentices, allowing for heterogeneity in 
apprentices’ initial education levels. Section 4 describes the data, while Section 5 elaborates on 
our identification strategy. Section 6 presents the empirical results and examines the changes in 
the key indicators that have occurred since the implementation of the policy and the extent to 
which these changes can be attributed to the policy. Section 7 includes a discussion of our 
results. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Secondary schooling and the apprenticeship system in Germany 
In the German apprenticeship market, firms decide whether they want to post any vacancies for 
apprenticeship training, and individuals can in turn apply for advertised training positions. 
Following a screening and selection process, the firm and apprentice then sign a training 
contract that specifies the wage, training and working conditions for the entire duration of the 
apprenticeship program. In principle, wage levels are determined by collective agreements 
between employers’ associations and unions. These collectively bargained agreements usually 
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refer to sectors and regions rather than occupations or specific groups of apprentices. For 
example, apprentice wages in collective agreements rarely differentiate between more 
experienced apprentices and those with different schooling backgrounds. This means that firms 
often pay one fixed wage that does not vary at the firm level despite differences in apprentices 
such as age, education or training occupation. Firms for which the collective agreements are 
not legally binding may deviate from their wage-setting rules by offering apprentice wages of 
no less than 20% below the minimum wage. Thus, such firms can, in principle, adjust wages in 
response to supply or demand shocks when hiring new apprentices. Signing a contract implies 
that the firm commits to the provision of training according to occupation-specific and 
nationally binding training curricula. At the end of the training period, apprentices take a 
standardized external exam to obtain their skilled worker qualification (Facharbeiter). The 
system is characterized by a large coverage of occupations across all industries. Clerical 
occupations, technical and metal producing occupations, and traditional craft occupations are 
among the most popular apprenticeships. The median duration of an apprenticeship is three 
years. The 20 most popular training occupations account for approximately half of the 500,000 
new apprenticeship contracts in Germany (BIBB, 2017b). 
The high school reform 
The high school reform resulted from Germany’s commitment to the Bologna Process that aims 
to ensure the comparability of higher education qualifications across European member states. 
From 2001, most federal states (Länder) started to implement the school reform by reducing 
the minimum duration of a high school degree (Abitur) by one year while keeping the 
curriculum content unaltered. The timing of the reform implementation was decided by each 
state individually (Figure A1). As a consequence, implementation took place in different years. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the increases in the number of high school graduates in West Germany 
and East Germany, respectively. The increasing number of high school graduates is clearly 
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visible in many states despite the overall number of graduates decreasing substantially in this 
period. In addition, the school reform caused the number of graduates to increase sharply at the 
time when the double cohort graduated in a particular state. 
 
Figure 1: Number of high school graduates 2007–2015, West Germany 
  
Source: Destatis (2016, 2019) 
 
Because of the compressed high school curriculum, high school graduates with a shortened 
schooling duration could have different characteristics compared to those graduates from prior 
years. However, studies examining competency outcomes (Dahmann 2017) as well as dropout, 
performance, and motivation (Meyer and Thomsen 2017) find no effects, while other studies 
find moderate effects for school grades, the probability of grade repetition, and personality traits 
(Büttner and Thomsen 2015; Dahmann and Anger 2014). In summary, the empirical findings 
suggest that—if any—the German high school reform had only small effects on the cognitive 
and noncognitive skills of high school graduates. From a firm’s perspective, this implies that 
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the characteristics of potential applicants for apprenticeship positions with a high school degree 
are largely comparable before and after the high school reform. 
 
Figure 2: Number of high school graduates 2007–2015, East Germany 
 
Source: Destatis (2016, 2019) 
 
In summary, the empirical findings suggest that—if any—the German high school reform had 
only small effects on the cognitive and noncognitive skills of high school graduates. From a 
firm’s perspective, this implies that the characteristics of potential applicants for apprenticeship 
positions with a high school degree are largely comparable before and after the high school 
reform. 
 
3. Supply shocks in the German apprenticeship market 
Supply shocks in the labor market are usually studied in the literature on immigration. 
Theoretical models often assume competition, production functions that allow for 
substitutability between workers, and wages that are fixed in the short run but flexible in the 
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long run.4 To develop a hypothesis on the possible effects of a one-time supply shock of high 
school graduates in the apprenticeship market, this section uses a simple static supply and 
demand framework.5 In this model, two types of apprentices compete in the apprenticeship 
market.6 High school apprentices 𝑥! require a minimum of 12 to 13 years of education (A = 
Abitur = high school/gymnasium graduates), whereas apprentices from lower schools 𝑥"! 
require 9 to 10 years of education (NA = No Abitur = lower secondary school graduates). 
Apprenticeship output 𝑦 is produced according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
technology: 
𝑦 = $𝛼𝑥!
# + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥"!
# +
!
" 
where 0 < 𝛼 < 1 is the constant share parameter and −∞ < 𝜌 ≤ 1 determines the degree of 
substitutability between 𝑥! and 𝑥"!. In this market, training firms are price takers. The marginal 
costs of apprenticeship contracting are fixed and differ between the two types, with 𝑤! ≥
𝑤"! > 0. Firms minimize their expected training costs subject to 𝑦: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	𝑤!𝑥! +𝑤"!𝑥"! 
When short-run output 𝑦; is constant, the respective input demand functions are7 
𝑥!∗(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦) = 𝛾𝑦; >
𝑤!
𝛼 ?
!
"#!
						𝑎𝑛𝑑						𝑥"!∗ (𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦) = 𝛾𝑦; >
𝑤"!
1 − 𝛼?
!
"#!
 
with 𝛾 = B𝛼 >%$
&
?
"
"#! + (1 − 𝛼) >%%$
'(&
?
"
"#!C
(!"
. 
The firm’s cost function is 
 
4 Pischke and Velling (1997) provide an empirical study of supply shocks in the German labor market. They find 
little to no evidence of substitution effects due to immigration. The more recent study by Dustmann et al. (2017) 
considers the heterogeneity between skilled and unskilled workers and finds a small decline in local wages and a 
substantial effect on unemployment due to immigration. This effect, however, is primarily due to firms reducing 
their input of new labor (diminishing their hiring rate). The authors find no evidence that firms increase their firing 
rate to make space for new workers. Thus, incumbent workers tend to be shielded from the supply shocks of 
foreign workers. 
5 See Borjas (2015) and the references therein. 
6 Only a few training occupations have a very high within-occupation share of apprentices with a high school 
degree (e.g., bank clerk), indicating that applicants with high and low levels of education can indeed be 
considered substitutes across a wide range of occupations (Figure A4). 
7 See Appendix A for the derivations. 
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𝑐(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦) = 𝑤!𝑥!∗(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦) + 𝑤"!𝑥"!∗ (𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦). 
The marginal and average costs are the same and do not depend on the level of output: 
𝑐(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦)
𝑦 =
𝜕𝑐(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦)
𝜕𝑦 = 𝛾 B𝑤! >
𝑤!
𝛼 ?
!
"#!
+𝑤"! >
𝑤"!
1 − 𝛼?
!
"#!
C. 
 
An upward shock in the supply of 𝒙𝑨 when the two inputs are substitutes 
We first consider the case most commonly used in (immigration) studies of supply shocks in 
the labor market. This occurs when factor inputs 𝑥! and 𝑥"! have a unit elasticity of substitution 
(𝜌 = 0) and training output can be written as resulting from Cobb–Douglas technology as 
follows: 
𝑦 = 𝑥!&𝑥"!
('(&). 
Under competition, the input shares are independent of the relative costs 𝑤! 𝑤"!⁄ . The marginal 
productivities for 𝑥!	and 𝑥"! that result from the competitive equilibrium inputs before the 
introduction of the high school reform can be expressed, respectively, as 
𝑤! = 𝛼 I
𝑥!
𝑥"!
J
&('
					𝑎𝑛𝑑						𝑤"! = (1 − 𝛼) I
𝑥!
𝑥"!
J
&
. 
The implications of a positive supply shock in 𝑥! on the labor market conditions in the short 
run are set by the laws of supply and demand. When the supply curve for 𝑥"! is upward-sloping 
and the demand curve is downward-sloping, a positive shock in the supply of 𝑥! reduces the 
equilibrium input of 𝑥"! (Borjas 2003). The shift in the supply of higher educated apprentices 
𝑥! lowers their productivity !!"!!#! < 0$ and increases that of	𝑥"! >
𝜕𝑤𝑁𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
> 0?. 
Let 𝑥,- be the total number of apprenticeships, with t Î {0; 1}; t = 0 marks the point in time 
before the high school reform and t = 1 marks the point in time after the high school reform; i 
Î {A; NA }. The corresponding supply and demand curves are denoted 𝑆,- and 𝐷,-, respectively. 
The short-run outcomes are summarized as follows: 
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𝑥"!' < 𝑥"!. 				𝑎𝑛𝑑				𝑥!' > 𝑥!. 
𝑤"!' > 𝑤"!. 				𝑎𝑛𝑑				𝑤!' < 𝑤!. 
The share of high school apprentices 𝑥! (𝑥! + 𝑥"!)⁄  increases because short-run demand 
increases for 𝑥! and decreases for 𝑥"!. 
An upward shock in the supply of 𝒙𝑨 when the two inputs are complements 
Next, we consider the case in which 𝑥! and 𝑥"! are complementary inputs producing 𝑦 in fixed 
proportions. The short-run effect of a positive supply shock in 𝑥! with 𝑥"! remaining constant 
is comparable to the case of inelastic demand for 𝑥! (see Figure A2 in the appendix). In this 
case, the short-run effects in the apprenticeship market can be summarized as 
𝑥"!' = 𝑥"!. 				𝑎𝑛𝑑				𝑥!' = 𝑥!., 
𝑤"!' = 𝑤"!. 				𝑎𝑛𝑑				𝑤!' < 𝑤!.. 
The share of high school apprentices 𝑥! (𝑥! + 𝑥"!)⁄  thus remains unchanged. In the short run, 
the productivity of lower school apprentices 𝑤"! is constant, while 𝑤! decreases. 
What if wages are sticky? 
Several factors may cause wage rigidity. Apart from implicit contracts and efficiency wages, 
firm-level institutions such as collective bargaining or works councils, which are especially 
relevant in the contexts of German labor markets, could prevent wage adjustments in response 
to productivity shocks. A short-run analysis of the case for wage rigidity is particularly 
interesting because the implementation of the high school reform in different states takes place 
in one-year periods at different times. The marginal productivity of high school apprentices is 
likely to exceed that of lower secondary school apprentices. Moreover, because apprentices 
from the pre-reform cohort are one year older at the time of graduation, the marginal 
productivity of the reform cohort may be lower. This would imply that 
𝑤"! < 𝑤!' ≤ 𝑤!.. 
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When wages are fixed, ceteris paribus, demand for high school apprentices 𝑥! falls relative to 
demand for lower school apprentices 𝑥"! because 𝑤!. = 𝑤!'. Hence, 𝑤!' is now “too high,” 
while 𝑤"! remains constant. Whether this effect is observed depends on the fixed wage level 
for high school apprentices, 𝑤!∗. 
Figure A3 in the appendix illustrates the situation of institutionally restricted apprentice wages. 
No initial adjustment to the equilibrium level 𝑤!∗ occurs since demand for highly educated 
apprentices is too high and 𝑤!∗ is too low. Wages are set at a level that is too low to clear the 
market. Given wage 𝑤!∗, demand for high school apprentices exceeds supply. The market is 
characterized by excess demand. When a supply shock occurs, the result is that the supply of 
highly educated apprentices is absorbed entirely by firms such that 
𝑥"!' = 𝑥"!. 				𝑎𝑛𝑑				𝑥!' > 𝑥!.. 
Thus, for the scenarios of substitutes, complements, and wage rigidity, we can formulate the 
following relationships between employment and wages: 
𝒙𝑨, 𝒙𝑵𝑨 substitutes 𝒙𝑨, 𝒙𝑵𝑨 complements wage rigidity 
𝑥"!' < 𝑥"!. ; 	𝑥!' > 𝑥!. 𝑥"!' = 𝑥"!. ; 	𝑥!' = 𝑥!. 𝑥"!' = 𝑥"!. ; 	𝑥!' > 𝑥!. 
𝑤"!' > 𝑤"!. ; 	𝑤!' < 𝑤!. 𝑤"!' = 𝑤"!. ; 	𝑤!' < 𝑤!. 𝑤"!' = 𝑤"!. ; 	𝑤!' = 𝑤!. 
 
4. Data and variable construction 
More than two-thirds of German youth graduate from lower secondary schools.8 The dominant 
choice of most individuals is to apply for an apprenticeship in the “dual system”, which 
 
8 After primary school, usually at the age of 10, students continue their education in one of three secondary 
school types based on their performance in the primary schools. While lower secondary tracks (Hauptschule and 
Realschule) require another five to six years of school attendance after the first four years of elementary school, 
upper secondary high school entrants study another eight to nine years. The school types vary not only in terms 
of the number of schooling years but also in terms of the level of expected learning abilities (see also Wößmann 
2016). 
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combines in-company training with part-time education in a vocational school. The typical 
starting age for an apprenticeship is between 16 and 20 years old. Overall, more than 500,000 
new apprenticeship contracts are signed each year, and with most apprenticeships lasting three 
years, approximately 1.5 million young adults are enrolled in an apprenticeship at any given 
point in time (BIBB 2017a). 
Figure 3: High school and lower secondary school degree applicants 2007 to 2015 
 
Source: BIBB Data Reports 2008–2016 (https://www.bibb.de/datenreport/). Lower secondary school degree 
contains both graduates of lower secondary schools and those without a secondary degree. 
 
Although they have access to a university education, a significant share of high school graduates 
apply for an apprenticeship (BIBB 2017a). Figure 3 shows the number of high school applicants 
relative to the number of applicants with lower secondary school degrees between 2007 and 
2017. The share of applicants with a high school degree increased from approximately 14% in 
2007 to 27% in 2017. This indicates that in comparison to other school graduates, high school 
graduates have become more prevalent in the apprenticeship market in recent years. 
The data source for our empirical analysis is the universe of all new yearly apprenticeship 
contracts provided by the Federal Statistical Office. The data include training characteristics 
(e.g., of the contract holder) and regional and occupation-specific information. We construct an 
14%
15%
19% 20% 22%
23% 24% 25% 26%
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Lower School Degree High School Degree
 13 
occupation-level panel data set that includes the number of new contracts in a given occupation, 
state and year. We end up with 321 apprenticeship occupations for the 16 federal states over 
the period 2007 to 2015. 
Second, our measure of the potential supply of apprentices is the number of graduates from 
high schools (having obtained upper secondary degrees) and of graduates from lower secondary 
schools. Statistics on the yearly number of school graduates are available from the Federal 
Statistical Office (Destatis 2016, 2019). Table 1 shows the growth rate of apprenticeship 
contracts per state from 2008 to 2015. Although it is not possible to quantify reform effects 
based on the descriptive information in the table, some states indeed show a clear increase in 
the growth rate of apprenticeship contracts with high school graduates in the year when a 
particular state was affected by the high school reform. Bavaria and Lower Saxony, for 
example, show an increase in apprenticeship contracts among individuals who have obtained a 
high school degree of almost 30% in the year when the reform affected high school graduation 
rates. However, some smaller states were likely affected by reform-induced graduation rates in 
neighboring states, as high school graduates may apply for out-of-state apprenticeships. 
Bremen, a small city-state, is fully surrounded by the much larger state of Lower Saxony. Thus, 
in the year when the double cohort in Lower Saxony graduated, the number of apprenticeships 
in Bremen increased sharply because many apprentices employed by firms located in Bremen 
actually reside in Lower Saxony. However, even in the year prior to the reform, approximately 
one-third of all apprentices in Bremen lived in Lower Saxony (Table A1). We can explain this 
observation by the fact that the population of Lower Saxony is more than ten times larger than 
that of the city-state of Bremen. To take into account such interrelations between neighboring 
states, we also analyze subsamples of states affected by the school reform in different years.9 
 
9 We drop the state of Hesse from our analysis because double graduation from high school stretched over two 
years. 
 14 
However, in general, we find that the vast majority of apprentices live and work in the same 
state and that the reform did not increase cross-border mobility (Table A1). 
 
Table 1: Growth rate of the number of apprentices with a high school degree (by state), 2008–2015 
Year SH HH NI HB NW HE RP BW BY SL BE BB MV SN ST TH 
2008 -8% -10% -6% 4% 2% -1% 3% -8% -2% 11% -1% 3% 21% 4% -13% -3% 
2009 10% 3% -2% -2% -2% -5% -4% 2% -13% 1% -5% -3% -10% -5% -7% -9% 
2010 8% 11% 7% 3% 5% 7% 11% 9% 12% -5% 2% -10% -13% -12% -12% -3% 
2011 16% 6% 27% 14% 8% 11% 12% 19% 30% -4% -3% -8% -5% 1% -6% -6% 
2012 -2% -2% -6% -5% 3% 3% 3% 11% -3% 11% 4% -7% -12% -7% -15% -10% 
2013 1% -2% 0% -3% 7% 0% 0% -3% 0% -8% -7% -8% -2% -11% -2% -12% 
2014 6% 1% 5% -1% -2% 2% 7% 7% 8% 5% 4% -4% 0% 3% -4% 1% 
2015 12% 3% 5% 0% 4% 4% 7% 7% 10% 4% 4% 6% 5% 9% 1% 3% 
Notes: Gray cells indicate the year in which a double cohort graduated from high school due to the reform. 
SH=Schleswig-Holstein, HH=Hamburg, NI=Lower Saxony, HB=Bremen, NW=North Rhine-Westphalia, 
HE=Hesse, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, BW=Baden-Württemberg, BY=Bavaria, SL=Saarland, BE=Berlin, 
BB=Brandenburg, MV=Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, SN=Saxony, ST=Saxony-Anhalt, TH=Thuringia. Source: 
Federal Statistical Office contract data.  
 
Finally, we exploit an administrative data set (the 100% sample of the “integrated labor market 
biographies”) (IEB; see Antoni et al. 2019), which contains information on daily apprentice 
wages at the three-digit occupation level. This is the only representative data source in Germany 
that allows us to calculate apprentice wages at the occupation level in a particular state and over 
time. Table 2 shows the development of daily apprentice wages in German states from 2007 to 
2015. On average, apprentices with a high school degree earn 17 to 30 euros per day in their 
first year of training. Apprentice wages increased strongly over our observation period; 
however, the level of apprentice pay clearly differed by state. In particular, apprentice wages 
were substantially lower in East Germany at the beginning of our observation period, although 
East German apprentice wages caught up over time and reduced the gap with the western states 
substantially.10 While differences in apprentice wages across states can be due to regional 
heterogeneity in collective bargaining agreements, wages are also related to differences in 
 
10 On average, apprentices with a high school degree earn approximately 12.5% more than apprentices without a 
high school degree. This difference is largely due to sorting of high school apprentices into higher paying 
apprenticeship occupations. 
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economic activity across states and thus differences in the relative importance of particular 
training occupations.11 
 
Table 2: Average daily wage of new apprentices with a high school degree (in euros, by state), 2007–2015 
Year SH HH NI HB NW HE RP BW BY SL BE BB MV SN ST TH 
2007 21.3 23.4 21.5 21.2 22.2 23.5 22.1 24.6 22.9 22.0 21.8 17.6 17.3 17.6 17.6 16.9 
2008 21.8 23.8 22.1 22.2 23.1 23.9 22.9 25.3 23.5 23.2 22.2 18.8 18.3 18.7 19.2 18.1 
2009 22.0 24.0 22.6 22.0 23.4 24.3 23.4 25.6 23.7 23.0 22.5 19.7 19.6 19.4 19.9 18.3 
2010 22.5 24.2 22.8 22.9 23.6 24.3 23.6 25.3 23.9 22.8 22.1 20.2 19.5 19.8 20.6 19.2 
2011 22.5 24.5 22.8 22.7 23.6 24.7 23.0 25.2 24.2 22.9 22.1 21.0 20.2 19.5 21.5 20.3 
2012 24.0 25.7 24.6 23.9 24.7 26.8 25.1 28.6 26.0 24.8 24.6 22.5 21.7 20.7 21.8 21.8 
2013 24.3 25.6 25.5 24.8 25.3 26.8 25.2 28.2 26.2 25.2 24.5 23.4 21.9 21.9 22.7 22.7 
2014 24.9 26.2 26.0 25.5 25.9 27.4 25.7 28.7 26.6 25.5 25.4 23.8 22.9 22.4 23.7 23.6 
2015 25.5 26.9 26.5 25.6 26.4 27.8 26.3 29.1 27.5 26.0 25.8 24.2 23.6 23.2 24.4 24.5 
Notes: Gray cells indicate the year in which a double cohort graduated from high school due to the reform. 
SH=Schleswig-Holstein, HH=Hamburg, NI=Lower Saxony, HB=Bremen, NW=North Rhine-Westphalia, 
HE=Hesse, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, BW=Baden-Württemberg, BY=Bavaria, SL=Saarland, BE=Berlin, 
BB=Brandenburg, MV=Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, SN=Saxony, ST=Saxony-Anhalt, TH=Thuringia. Source: 
IEB employer–employee linked data. 
 
 
5. Identification strategy 
In our first step, we apply difference-in-differences estimation techniques to identify the effect 
of the high school reform on the number of new apprenticeship contracts and the corresponding 
wages of new apprentices. Second, to identify whether the relationship between school leavers 
and apprenticeship contracts differs in a year when the number of graduates was affected by the 
school reform, we estimate the elasticity of the number of apprenticeship contracts (and 
apprentice wages) with respect to the number of school leavers with a high school and lower 
secondary school qualification. Finally, we use an instrumental variable panel regression and 
exploit the exogenous change in the supply of apprentices that was caused by the high school 
reform. For each step and each regression, we provide overall results for Germany and separate 
results for West and East Germany. The reason for doing so is that even more than 30 years 
 
11 The automotive industry, for example, is particularly important in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Lower 
Saxony, but much less important in many other states. 
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after reunification, training and labor markets are still shaped by stark differences between East 
and West Germany (Schnabel 2016). 
Difference-in-differences estimation to identify the effects of the high school reform 
We estimate the following fixed-effects panel model, where we denote the log number of new 
contracts of apprentices with a high school degree in occupation 𝑜 in state 𝑠 in year t as 
 
𝑎01-23 = 𝛼01 + 𝜆-23 + 𝜃23𝐺81- + 𝛾023𝑡0 + 𝛾123𝑡1 + 𝜖01-23  
where the difference-in-differences estimator is 𝜃23, as 𝐺81- is an indicator variable equal to 1 
when graduation rates were affected by the school reform in year 𝑡	in state 𝑠. Thus, 𝜃23 is an 
estimate of the average number of additional apprenticeship contracts signed because of the 
school reform across all German states. Moreover, 𝛼01 controls for the fixed effects for 
occupation o in state s and accounts for the fact that the baseline shares of apprentices with a 
high school degree vary by training occupation and state. The year dummies 𝜆-23 control for 
year-specific effects. The trend variable 𝑡0 at occupation level 𝑜 controls for occupation-
specific developments over time, and 𝑡1 controls for developments at the state level.12 Thus, we 
assume that when accounting for all these factors, states other than those in which graduation 
rates were affected by the reform in a particular year 𝑡 show comparable development (common 
trends) in the number of apprenticeship contracts. We also provide robustness checks by 
analyzing subsamples of neighboring states (e.g., Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg). In such 
states, it may be even more reasonable to assume that both economic development and general 
interest in the apprenticeship training of individuals and firms are more comparable than for 
states that differ more in their geographic proximity. 
 
12 Jansen et al. (2017) estimate a model similar to this one. 
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Second, we estimate an identical specification, but with the initial log daily wages of new 
apprentices as the dependent variable, to identify the potential wage effects of the high school 
reform 𝐷: 
𝑤01-23 = 𝛼01 + 𝜆-23 + 𝜃23𝐷1- + 𝛾023𝑡0 + 𝛾123𝑡1 + 𝜖01-23 	
Again, we assume that the state, occupation, and time fixed effects as well as the trend variables 
at the state and occupation levels account for the relevant factors that drive apprentice wages, 
such that any other unobserved factors in year 𝑡 are not associated with the timing of the school 
reform. Thus, the difference-in-differences estimator 𝜃23 measures the effect of the high school 
reform on apprentice wages. To account for the fact that apprentice wages vary by economic 
sectors, we also provide robustness checks using subsamples of occupational fields at the 1-
digit level. 
Estimating the elasticity of apprenticeship contracts with respect to school graduates 
While the difference-in-differences estimation yields the direct effect of the high school reform 
on the number of apprenticeship contracts and wages, we are also interested in analyzing the 
extent to which the number of high school graduates is associated with the number of 
apprenticeship contracts for individuals with a high school degree. As shown in Section 4, the 
share of apprentices with a high school degree has increased substantially in recent years. Thus, 
we estimate the elasticity of the number of apprenticeship contracts with respect to the number 
of high school graduates: 
𝑎01-23 = 𝛼01 + 𝜆-23 + 𝜃23𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠1- + 𝛾023𝑡0+𝛾123𝑡1 + 𝜖01-23 , 
where 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠1- is defined as the log number of individuals who graduate from high school 
in year 𝑡 and state 𝑠. Moreover, we include the same fixed effects and trend variables as in the 
difference-in-differences specification above. 
Second, we estimate an identical specification, but with the log daily wage of apprentices as the 
dependent variable: 
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𝑤01-23 = 𝛼01 + 𝜆-23 + 𝜃23𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠1- + 𝛾023𝑡0+𝛾123𝑡1 + 𝜖01-23 . 
Instrumental variable estimation 
Finally, we estimate the association between high school graduates and the number of 
apprenticeship contracts (and apprentice wages) in the year in which the high school reform led 
to an increase in high school graduation rates. We use the high school reform as an instrument 
for the number of graduates, as the reform itself constitutes plausibly exogenous variation in 
the number of high school graduates. The school reform is a valid instrument to the extent that 
its implementation date (in period 𝑡 − 8) is independent of the number of apprenticeship 
contracts in period 𝑡. Further, as the school reform was unrelated to any issues in the vocational 
education and training system, and thus the development of apprenticeship contracts, it 
constitutes a valid instrument. Moreover, the timing of the implementation can be considered 
random, as political processes in some states may require more time for reasons unrelated to 
current developments in the apprenticeship market. Thus, we can interpret the results as a local 
average treatment effect: we identify the extent to which the number of apprenticeship contracts 
and apprentice wages are affected by the reform-induced change in the number of high school 
graduates. 
 
6. Results 
In this section, we first report our difference-in-differences estimates and then discuss the 
results from our panel fixed-effects and instrumental variable panel fixed-effects regressions to 
identify the association between the number of high school graduates and our dependent 
variables of interest. Finally, we report robustness checks and test for anticipation effects of the 
high school reform. 
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Difference-in-differences estimates 
As expected, the positive supply shock led to an increase in apprenticeship contracts for 
individuals with a high school degree. For Germany as a whole, the high school reform raised 
the number of apprenticeship contracts by 7.8%. The effect was somewhat lower in West 
Germany (7%) and higher in East Germany (12.3%), as reported in Table 3. However, the 
positive supply shock of high school graduates had no effect on the number of apprenticeship 
contracts among individuals with lower secondary school degrees, as reported in Table 4. Thus, 
these results are not in line with the predictions of our theoretical model that assumes that 
apprentices with different education levels were substitutes in the production process. 
With regard to apprenticeship wages, we expect a negative effect of the high school reform if 
markets are competitive. However, our occupation-level panel fixed-effects estimates show no 
evidence of any negative wage effects due to the high school reform once we account for state-
level trends in apprentice wages (Table 5). Similarly, we find no wage effects from the reform 
when estimating a panel fixed-effects regression model at the occupational level for the 
subsample of apprentices without a high school degree once we include a trend variable at the 
state level (Table 6).13 
Thus, our results suggest that the institutional setting of the German apprenticeship system 
prevents firms from adjusting wages downward. The implication of this finding is that there 
was excess demand for apprentices with a high school degree prior to the reform-induced supply 
shock. While no formal rules prevent training firms from increasing their wage offers when 
facing a shortage in supply to the market-clearing level, institutions such as the collective 
 
13 As a robustness check, we also ran a pooled OLS regression based on individual-level administrative data 
from the Institute for Employment Research (Table A2). We find no evidence of a wage decrease for high school 
apprentices due to the high school reform, which is in line with our occupation-level panel fixed-effects 
regressions in Table 6. The point estimates in models 1 and 2 are even positive, although the magnitude of the 
estimates are (despite their statistical significance) not economically significant. Focusing on apprentices without 
a high school degree, we find a negative association between wages and the school reform (Table 8, models 4-6), 
although the effects are mainly driven by individuals in East Germany. However, note that pooled OLS 
regressions at the individual level cannot take into account effects of high school graduates sorting into training 
occupations. Therefore, our preferred identification strategy is the use of panel fixed-effects regression models 
that use aggregated data at the occupation-level within states and over time. 
 20 
bargaining system or works councils may impose informal constraints on firms to not raise 
wages above the level specified in the corresponding bargaining agreement and to prevent firms 
from offering wages that differ by education levels. 
 
Table 3: Effects of the high school reform on the number of apprenticeship contracts among 
high school graduates 
ln(contracts HS degree) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
High school reform 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.078*** 0.070*** 0.123*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.030) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.015*** 1.899*** 1.855*** 1.912*** 1.782*** 
  (0.010) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.065) 
Observations 23470 23470 23470 16237 7233 
𝑅4 0.027 0.053 0.209 0.252 0.204 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 
5% level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Effects of the high school reform on the number of apprenticeship contracts among 
lower secondary school graduates 
ln(contracts LS degree) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 West Germany 
East 
Germany 
High school reform 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.007 0.004 0.001 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.025) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.632*** 3.565*** 3.478*** 3.672*** 3.386*** 
  (0.008) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) 
Observations 22213 22213 22213 15433 6780 
𝑅4 0.044 0.085 0.192 0.183 0.331 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	
the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
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Table 5: Effects of the high school reform on the apprentice wages of high school graduates 
ln(apprentice wage HS degree) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 West Germany 
East 
Germany 
High school reform -0.009** -0.008* -0.002 0.002 -0.017 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.895*** 2.896*** 2.907*** 2.948*** 2.724*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) 
Observations 6375 6375 6375 4660 1715 
𝑅4 0.489 0.509 0.535 0.491 0.617 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	
the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Effects of the high school reform on the apprentice wages of lower secondary school 
graduates 
ln(apprentice wage LS 
degree) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
High school reform -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.756*** 2.751*** 2.771*** 2.834*** 2.563** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
Observations 10833 10833 10833 7594 3239 
𝑅4 0.602 0.632 0.654 0.629 0.702 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	
the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
 
To allow for heterogeneity of the reform effects across occupations that differ in terms of the 
share of apprentices with a high school degree, we carried out some additional regressions. 
Interestingly, we find that the high school reform led to a homogenous increase in the number 
of apprenticeship contracts among individuals with a high school degree in West Germany, 
independent of the within-occupation share of apprentices with a high school degree (Table 
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A3). In East Germany, however, the high school reform led to a disproportionately large 
increase in apprenticeship contracts in occupations where less than 50% of apprentices hold a 
high school degree.14 However, we again find no statistically significant wage effects of the 
high school reform (Table A4). 
Elasticity of apprenticeship contracts and wages with respect to graduates 
In general, we expect markets to react to changes in supply. Indeed, our empirical results show 
that an increase in the number of high school graduates is positively associated with the number 
of new apprenticeship contracts. Table 7 shows that a 1% increase in the number of high school 
graduates is associated with an increase in the number of apprenticeship contracts of 0.15% in 
West Germany and 0.25% in East Germany. Our elasticity estimate is lower than that of Maier 
and Walden (2014), who report an elasticity of 0.60 based on a state-level analysis between 
1983 and 2003. However, it is in line with the results of Baldi et al. (2014), who estimate an 
elasticity of 0.22 for the period 1999–2012. 
Turning to apprentice wages, our results show no statistically significant relationship between 
the number of high school graduates and the wages of apprentices with a high school degree 
once we control for state-level trends (Model 3, Table 8). Although the point estimates are 
negative and statistically significant before including state-level trends (which may partly 
control for demographic changes as well), their economic significance is very low, as the 
coefficients indicate an elasticity of merely 0.05 (Models 1 and 2, Table 8). Including state-
level trends is important, however, because many collective bargaining agreements specify 
different wages across states.15 
 
14 Thus, sorting of high school graduates into training occupations differed between West and East Germany, 
which can also explain why we find negative wage effects when analyzing individual-level wage data in a 
pooled regression for East Germany (Table A2). 
15 We estimated the models reported in Table 7 and Table 8 also for apprentices with a lower secondary school 
degree. The results are similar, as we find a positive association between school graduates and the number of 
contracts, but no statistically significant association between school graduates and apprentice wages (see Tables 
A5 and A6). 
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In the next subsection, we explicitly test whether the reform-induced increase in the supply of 
apprentices had a statistically significant effect on the number of apprenticeship contracts 
among and wages of apprentices with a high school degree. 
 
Table 7: Elasticity of apprenticeship contracts with respect to high school graduates: Panel 
fixed-effects regression 
Dependent variable: 
ln(apprenticeship contracts HS degree) Model 1 Model 2 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
ln(graduates HS) 0.335*** 0.201*** 0.152*** 0.249*** 
  (0.014) (0.021) (0.025) (0.055) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No Yes Yes Yes 
State and occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.170*** -1.002 0.464** -0.512 
  (0.133) (0.199) (0.236) (0.521) 
Observations 23470 23470 16237 7233 
𝑅4 0.051 0.211 0.252 0.204 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	
the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Elasticity of apprentice wages with respect to high school graduates: Panel fixed-
effects regression 
Dependent variable: 
ln(apprentice wage HS 
degree) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 West Germany 
East 
Germany 
ln(graduates HS) -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.002 0.006 -0.036 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.027) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.388*** 3.365*** 2.817*** 2.846*** 3.055*** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.079) (0.091) (0.261) 
Observations       6375        6375     6375       4660        1715 
𝑅4       0.497       0.516    0.535      0.491       0.617 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	
the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
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Instrumental variable estimation 
Our first-stage estimates in Table 9 clearly show the strength of the effect of the high school 
reform on the number of high school graduates. On average, the high school reform increased 
the number of apprenticeship contracts among individuals with a high school degree by 
exp(0.5), or approximately 65%. The second-stage results are similar to those reported in Table 
7. In West Germany, a 1% increase in the supply of high school graduates is associated with a 
0.14% increase in the number of apprenticeship contracts among individuals with a high school 
degree (Table 9). These results suggest that firms absorbed the increase in the supply of 
apprentices with a high school degree in a way similar to that of other years, despite the marked 
reform-induced increase in graduation rates.16 
 
Table 9: Elasticity of apprenticeship contracts with respect to high school graduates: 
Instrumental variable panel fixed-effects regression 
 First stage: ln(graduates HS) Second stage: ln(apprenticeship contracts) 
  
Full 
sample 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany Model 1 Model 2 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
High school reform 0.500*** 0.504*** 0.458***     
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)     
ln(graduates HS)    0.181*** 0.155*** 0.139*** 0.269*** 
     (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.065) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State and occupation 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.479*** 9.504*** 9.208*** 0.254 0.424* 0.595** -0.696 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.184) (0.221) (0.243) (0.607) 
Observations 23470 16237 7233 23470 23470 16237 7233 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	the	5%	
level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
 
 
16 The results remain qualitatively similar when restricting the analysis to occupations with a share of high 
school graduates between 0.25 and 0.75 (i.e., to occupations with an intermediate share of apprentices with a 
high school degree). 
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Moreover, Table 10 also confirms the results of our panel fixed effects estimates in Table 6, as 
we find no empirical evidence that the high school reform-induced increase in the supply of 
high school graduates affected apprentice wages. While the results are not statistically 
significant, the point estimate for East Germany is negative (but still small in terms of its 
economic significance). Thus, as in regular years, our results suggest that the growth in 
apprentice wages for individuals with a high school degree is driven by factors other than the 
supply of high school graduates in a state. In summary, our empirical evidence suggests 
that	𝑥"!' = 𝑥"!. 				and				𝑥!' > 𝑥!., while 𝑤"!' = 𝑤"!. 				and				𝑤!' = 𝑤!., which supports the 
notion that the market can be characterized by excess demand for apprentices with a high school 
degree. 
 
Table 10: Elasticity of apprentice wages with respect to high school graduates: Instrumental 
variable panel fixed-effects regression 
  First stage: ln(graduates HS) Second stage: ln(apprentice wage) 
  Full sample 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany Model 1 Model 2 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
High school reform 0.493*** 0.496*** 0.437***     
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.0073)     
ln(graduates HS)    -0.016** -0.003 0.004 -0.039 
     (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.033) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State and occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.306*** 9.566*** 9.237*** 3.051*** 2.939*** 2.913*** 3.084*** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.073) (0.088) (0.091) (0.304) 
Observations 6375 4660 1715 6375 6375 4660 1715 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	the	5%	level;	∗	
significant	at	the	10%	level. 
 
Robustness checks 
We further analyze subsamples and consider different pairs of German states affected by the 
high school reform in different years to check whether our results are robust to a comparison of 
neighboring states that share a similar economic structure (e.g., Bavaria and Baden-
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Wuerttemberg) or non-bordering states in which few apprentices are expected to move across 
state borders in the control state, as the distance is too far (e.g., Bavaria and North Rhine-
Westphalia). Table 11 shows that the results based on these subsamples broadly confirm the 
previous results based on the full sample, where we found an average reform-induced increase 
of 7% in West Germany, although some of the point estimates (e.g., for BW & NW and BW& 
SL) tend to be somewhat higher. We also conduct a subsample analysis by occupational group 
(at the one-digit level) to test whether demographic fluctuations in the number of high school 
graduates may affect apprentice wages differently in homogeneous occupational groups. 
However, as shown in Table 12, none of the coefficients are statistically significant, although 
seven of the nine point estimates are negative (but small in absolute value). 
Table 11: Elasticity of apprenticeship contracts with respect to high school graduates: 
Subsamples and panel fixed-effects regression 
Dependent variable: 
ln(contracts HS degree) BY & BW BY & NW BY & NI BW & NW BW & RP BW & SL 
High school reform 0.080*** 0.040 0.085** 0.114** 0.090* 0.157*** 
  (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.052) (0.037) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.115*** 2.456*** 2.064*** 2.459** 1.919** 1.875*** 
  (0.058) (0.055) (0.066) (0.057) (0.060) (0.063) 
Observations 3893 4268 3809 4247 3478 3089 
R-squared 0.370 0.384 0.392 0.346 0.368 0.306 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. BW=Baden-Württemberg, BY=Bavaria, NI=Lower Saxony, 
HB=Bremen, NW=North Rhine-Westphalia, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, SL=Saarland. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% 
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. 
 
We further check whether there were any anticipation effects of reform-induced increases in 
graduation rates. Clearly, firms were aware that graduation rates would increase in a particular 
year, and thus, they could have altered their training behavior in the year before the supply 
shock.  
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The results in Table 13 show no statistically significant anticipation effects in West Germany, 
although we find a marginally significant and negative effect for East Germany. An explanation 
for this effect can be found in Figure 3 and Table 1, where both the number of high school 
graduates and (consequently) the share of apprentices with a high school degree decreased 
sharply in East German states between 2008 and 2011, likely because of demographic changes 
as well as the financial crisis and the associated migration of workers to other states. That period 
coincides with the build-up to the year in which the double cohort of high school students 
graduated in the state of Brandenburg. 
 
Table 12: Elasticity of apprentice wages with respect to high school graduates: Three-digit occupational 
fields, panel fixed-effects regression 
Dependent variable: 
ln(apprentice wage 
HS) 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
ln(graduates HS) -0.014 -0.006  -0.031 0.007 0.019 -0.005 -0.005 -0.023 -0.001 
  (0.028) (0.010) (0.023) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.026) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State and occupation 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.810** 2.980** 2.936** 3.051** 3.003** 2.952** 3.024** 2.636** 2.885** 
  (0.018) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) 
Observations 233 1444 403 429 282 841 600 266 400 
R-squared 0.661 0.394 0.463 0.738 0.583 0.537 0.611 0.622 0.247 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Occupational fields at the one-digit level: M1=Agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry, and horticulture, M2=Raw material extraction, production, and manufacturing, 
M3=Construction, architecture, surveying, and building technology, M4=Science, geography, and computer 
science, M5=Traffic, logistics, protection, and security, M6=Commercial services, goods trading, sales, hotels, 
and tourism, M7=Business organization, accounting, law, and administration, M8=Health, social issues, teaching, 
and education, M9=Linguistics, literature, humanities, social and economic sciences, media, art, culture, and 
design.	∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 13: Placebo test: Anticipation effects of the high school reform on the number of 
contracts 
Dependent variable: 
ln(contracts HS degree) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
𝐺8&'( -0.022** -0.025** -0.033*** -0.016 -0.075* 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.039) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational-level trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.024*** 1.908*** 1.849*** 1.918*** 1.825*** 
  (0.010) (0.027) (0.031) (0.036) (0.065) 
Observations 23470 23470 23470 16237 7233 
R-squared 0.023 0.014 0.207 0.250 0.202 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	 the	1%	 level;	∗∗	significant	at	 the	5%	 level;	∗	
significant	at	the	10%	level. 
 
 
7. Discussion 
When a positive supply shock occurs in a competitive market, the equilibrium wage falls, and 
the number of contracts increases. In Germany, such an adjustment could not be observed in 
response to a strong one-time supply shock that was the result of a school reform. While we 
identified an increase in the number of apprenticeship contracts with individuals holding a high 
school degree, we found no empirical evidence for substitution effects (i.e., a reduction in the 
number of apprentices with a lower school degree). Figure A2 illustrates the situation for 
apprenticeships and their institutionally restricted wage setting rules in Germany. Adjustment 
to the equilibrium level 𝑤!∗ does not occur since demand for highly educated apprentices is too 
high and the collectively set wage level 𝑤!∗ is too low to clear the market. These results support 
the notion that the market for apprentices with a high education level is characterized by excess 
demand, which can occur due to sticky wages. In Germany, collectively bargained wages do 
not formally differ by the educational qualifications of apprentices. Thus, to improve the 
efficiency of the market for apprentices with a high school degree, a cost-effective measure 
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would be to allow wages to differ by the education level of an apprentice in collective 
agreements. 
Although wages are sticky in the short run, firms may in turn find other ways to increase the 
attractiveness of apprenticeships for high school graduates (Göggel and Zwick, 2012). For 
example, more firms are starting to offer a combination of apprenticeships and university 
studies at the bachelor level. This “dual study” contract, demanding as it may be for high school 
apprentices, implies that apprentices spend less time in the firm and can allocate more time to 
their studies. Such a setting implicitly increases the hourly wage. Furthermore, regulations 
provide the option for high school graduates to shorten their training period by up to one year 
before signing the training contract. Apprentices then enter the second year of training straight 
away, receive a potentially higher starting wage and thus increase their individual rate of return 
to education. 
Our results also have implications for future supply shocks in the apprenticeship market. As 
firms seem to be unable to adjust wages downwards in the short run, supply shocks such as the 
recent wave of migrants in 2015 may lead to the transitional unemployment of applicants for 
apprenticeships or a strong increase in individuals in the transitory system. Such a scenario is 
particularly relevant for migrants with lower secondary schooling degrees who often have 
below-average cognitive skills (particularly a lack of language skills). Thus, in contrast to 
highly educated apprentices, firms are unlikely to have excess demand for this group of 
apprenticeship applicants. As a result, corresponding supply shocks would not be absorbed by 
the apprenticeship market, which is in line with the observation that in each year of our 
observation period, between 200,000 and 300,000 individuals (a large majority of them with a 
low schooling degree) were not successful in securing an apprenticeship contract and instead 
ended up in transitory vocational programs (BIBB 2017a). 
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8. Conclusion 
Recent trends towards academization are visible in many countries, with an increasing share of 
individuals enrolling in colleges and universities. However, we find that in recent years, 
apprenticeships have increased in popularity among German school graduates, even though 
such students could directly access a university education through their degree. This study 
analyzed the working of the market for highly educated apprentices. Specifically, it studied the 
effects of a recent school reform in Germany that led to a positive one-time supply shock of 
highly educated school graduates in the apprenticeship training market. Our results show that 
firms contracted with more apprentices with a high school degree without reducing demand for 
lower school graduates. Contrary to the prediction of theory under the assumptions of 
competitive markets, however, the increased supply of highly educated apprentices was 
absorbed by training firms without a reduction in apprentice wages. These findings support the 
notion that the market for high school apprentices is characterized by excess demand as a result 
of sticky wages in the German apprenticeship market. While wage stickiness may be associated 
with institutional factors such as collective bargaining agreements or works councils, 
empirically identifying the causes of sticky wages is beyond the scope of this paper and is 
therefore left for future research. However, from a policy perspective, increasing the flexibility 
of wage arrangements, especially for highly educated individuals, might help to improve the 
efficiency of the German apprenticeship market. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Apprenticeship output 𝑦 is produced according to a CES technology	
𝑦 = $𝛼𝑥!
# + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥"!
# +
!
", where 0 < 𝛼 < 1 is the constant share parameter and −∞ < 𝜌 ≤
1 determines the degree of substitutability between 𝑥! and 𝑥"!. The marginal costs of 
apprentices are fixed and differ between the two types of apprenticeships, with 𝑤! ≥ 𝑤"! > 0. 
In the short run, output 𝑦; is constant. Firms minimize their expected training costs 	𝑤!𝑥! +
𝑤"!𝑥"! subject to 𝑦;. 
 
The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
A1. ℒ(𝑥!, 𝑥"!, 𝜆|𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦;) = 𝑤!𝑥! +𝑤"!𝑥"! + 𝜆 I𝑦; − $𝛼𝑥!
# + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥"!
# +
!
"J. 
The first-order conditions are ℒ! =
5ℒ
57$
= 0, ℒ"! =
5ℒ
57%$
= 0, and ℒ8 =
5ℒ
58
= 0. The first two 
conditions show that at the point of equilibrium, the isoquant curve is tangent to the isocost line 
A2.   %$
%%$
= &
'(&
> 7$
7%$
?
#('
. 
The point of tangency determines the equilibrium inputs 𝑥!∗ and 𝑥"!∗  at output level 𝑦;. Rewrite 
A2 in terms of 𝑥! and 𝑥"!. Substituting into ℒ8 obtains the short-run demand functions for the 
two types of apprenticeships: 
A3i.  𝑥!∗(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦;) =
9:;)$* <
!
"#!
=&;)$* <
"
"#!>('(&);)%$!#* <
"
"#!?
!
"
, and 
A3ii.  𝑥"!∗ (𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦;) =
9:;)%$!#* <
!
"#!
=&;)$* <
"
"#!>('(&);)%$!#* <
"
"#!?
!
"
. 
The cost function is 𝑐(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦) = 𝑤!𝑥!∗(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦) + 𝑤"!𝑥"!∗ (𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦). 
Define 𝛾 ≡ B𝛼 >%$
&
?
"
"#! + (1 − 𝛼) >%%$
'(&
?
"
"#!C
(!"
. Now, it is straightforward to show that the 
marginal and average costs are the same and do not depend on the level of output: 
𝑐(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦)
𝑦 =
𝜕𝑐(𝑤!, 𝑤"!, 𝑦)
𝜕𝑦 = 𝛾 B𝑤! >
𝑤!
𝛼 ?
!
"#!
+𝑤"! >
𝑤"!
1 − 𝛼?
!
"#!
C. 
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Figure A1: Map of the implementation of the high school reform 
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Figure A2:  Highly inelastic or complementary demand for highly educated apprentices 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3: Highly elastic or excess demand for highly educated apprentices 
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Figure A4: Distribution of the share of high school apprentices across occupations 
 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office contract data. 
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Table A1: Share of apprentices with residence in the same state as their workplace 
 
Residence of apprentice (state) 
Work-
place SL HH MV NI HB NW HH RP SL BW BY BE BB ST TH SN 
Year prior to reform 
HH 0.20 0.60 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MV 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
HB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.65 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.94 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BB 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.85 0.01 0.00 0.01 
ST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.94 0.01 0.02 
Year of the reform 
HH 0.20 0.64 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MV 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 
NI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.66 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.93 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 
BB 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.83 0.01 0.00 0.02 
ST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.94 0.01 0.02 
Notes: The first column indicates the location of the apprentice’s workplace. Numbers indicate the share of 
apprentices residing in the same state as their workplace. SH=Schleswig-Holstein, HH=Hamburg, NI=Lower 
Saxony, HB=Bremen, NW=North Rhine-Westphalia, HE=Hesse, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, BW=Baden-
Württemberg, BY=Bavaria, SL=Saarland, BE=Berlin, BB=Brandenburg, MV=Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
SN=Saxony, ST=Saxony-Anhalt, TH=Thuringia. Source: IEB employer–employee linked data. 
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Table A2: Effects of the high school reform on apprentice wages using individual wage data 
 ln(apprentice wage) 𝑤!"# 𝑤!,%&#'"#  𝑤!,&(#'"#  𝑤!)*)"# 𝑤!,%&#')*)"#  𝑤!,&(#')*)"# 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
High school reform 0.002* 0.007*** 0.006 -0.014*** -0.007*** -0.020*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.812*** 2.825*** 2.767*** 2.647*** 2.655*** 2.574*** 
  (0.006) (0.00526) (0.0174) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Observations 653,542 565,237 88,305 2,717,073 2,334,099 382,974 
𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅+ 0.359 0.338 0.364 0.3926 0.3504 0.3956 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 0.1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 1% level; ∗ 
significant at the 5% level. Additional control variables: Gender (male/female). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Effects of the high school reform on apprenticeship contracts by within-occupation 
share of apprentices with a high school degree 
 
Dependent variable: West Germany East Germany 
ln(apprenticeship 
contracts HS degree) 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 0.25 <
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
> 0.5 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 0.25 <
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
> 0.5 
High school reform 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.163*** 0.080** 0.002 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.039) (0.035) (0.043) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State and occupation 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.859*** 2.591*** 2.795*** 1.637*** 2.525*** 2.425** 
  (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.050) (0.049) (0.056) 
Observations 11526 5960 4049 4908 2960 1956 
𝑅) 0.263 0.289 0.291 0.203 0.385 0.348 
Notes: !!,#$
!!,%&&
 denotes the share of apprentices with a high school degree in training occupation 𝑜. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	
the	10%	level. 
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Table A4: Effects of the high school reform on apprenticeship wages by within-occupation 
share of apprentices with a high school degree 
 
Dependent variable: West Germany East Germany 
ln(apprenticeship wages 
HS degree) 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 0.25 <
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
> 0.5 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 0.25 <
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
< 0.5 
𝑎!,#$
𝑎!,%&&
> 0.5 
High school reform 0.000 0.007 0.006 -0.026 0.018 -0.011 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State and occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.940*** 2.934*** 2.991*** 2.674*** 2.735*** 2.796*** 
  (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025) 
Observations 3257 2098 1379 1181 885 519 
𝑅) 0.477 0.475 0.578 0.638 0.644 0.658 
Notes: *',)*
*',+,,
 denotes the within-occupation share of apprentices with a high school degree. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	the	5%	level;	∗	significant	
at	the	10%	level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Elasticity of apprenticeship contracts with respect to lower secondary school (LS) 
graduates: Panel fixed-effects regression 
Dependent variable: 
ln(apprenticeship contracts LS degree) Model 1 Model 2 
West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
ln(graduates LS) 0.460*** 0.470*** 0.307*** 0.160 
  (0.031) (0.029) (0.070) (0.124) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No Yes Yes Yes 
State and occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.577*** -1.701*** -0.028 1.425 
  (0.320) (0.298) (0.730) (1.206) 
Observations 30321 30321 20619 9702 
𝑅4 0.090 0.235 0.232 0.327 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	
the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
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Table A6: Elasticity of apprentice wages with respect to lower secondary school graduates: 
Panel fixed-effects regression 
Dependent variable: 
ln(apprentice wage LS 
degree) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 West Germany 
East 
Germany 
ln(graduates LS) -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.022 -0.044 -0.113 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.033) (0.075) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-level trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-level occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.489*** 3.467*** 2.973*** 3.279*** 3.672*** 
  (0.104) (0.100) (0.227) (0.345) (0.734) 
Observations 9916 9916 9916 6717 3199 
𝑅4 0.610 0.640 0.661 0.635 0.709 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗	Significant	at	the	1%	level;	∗∗	significant	at	
the	5%	level;	∗	significant	at	the	10%	level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
